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ABSTRACT Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI) arose as systems that merge computing systems with
the human brain to facilitate recording, stimulation, and inhibition of neural activity. Over the years, the
development of BCI technologies has shifted towards miniaturization of devices that can be seamlessly
embedded into the brain and can target single neuron or small population sensing and control. We
present a motivating example highlighting vulnerabilities of two promising micron-scale BCI technologies,
demonstrating the lack of security and privacy principles in existing solutions. This situation opens the
door to a novel family of cyberattacks, called neuronal cyberattacks, affecting neuronal signaling. This
paper defines the first two neural cyberattacks, Neuronal Flooding (FLO) and Neuronal Scanning (SCA),
where each threat can affect the natural activity of neurons. This work implements these attacks in a
neuronal simulator to determine their impact over the spontaneous neuronal behavior, defining three metrics:
number of spikes, percentage of shifts, and dispersion of spikes. Several experiments demonstrate that both
cyberattacks produce a reduction of spikes compared to spontaneous behavior, generating a rise in temporal
shifts and a dispersion increase. Mainly, SCA presents a higher impact than FLO in the metrics focused
on the number of spikes and dispersion, where FLO is slightly more damaging, considering the percentage
of shifts. Nevertheless, the intrinsic behavior of each attack generates a differentiation on how they alter
neuronal signaling. FLO is adequate to generate an immediate impact on the neuronal activity, whereas
SCA presents higher effectiveness for damages to the neural signaling in the long-term.
INDEX TERMS Brain computer interfaces, Security, Artificial neural networks, Biological neural
networks
I. INTRODUCTION
BRAIN-COMPUTER Interfaces (BCIs) are consideredas bidirectional communication systems between the
brain and external computational devices. Although BCIs
arose as systems focused on controlling external devices such
as prosthetic limbs [1], they have gone one step further,
enabling artificial stimulation and inhibition of neuronal ac-
tivity [2]. In the last years, neuronal stimulation has already
been applied in different scenarios such as the provision of
sensory feedback to prosthetic or robotic limbs [3], treatment
of neurodegenerative diseases or disorders like Alzheimer’s
or depression [4], and even futuristic applications such as
interconnected networks of brains [5] or brains connected to
the Internet [6].
New BCI technologies are emerging, allowing a precise
acquisition, stimulation, and inhibition of neuronal signaling.
It reduces the brain damage caused by traditional invasive
BCI systems and improves the limitations of non-invasive
technologies such as attenuation, resolution, and distortion
constraints [7], [8]. One of the most recent and promising
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BCI technique focuses on the use of nanodevices allocated
across the brain cortex [9]. Specifically, a relevant task of
nanodevices equipped with optogenetic technology is the use
of light to stimulate or inhibit engineered neurons according
to different firing patterns sent by external transceivers [10].
Promising initiatives such as Neuralink aim to accelerate the
development of these technologies [11].
The previous BCI technologies hold the promise of chang-
ing our society by improving the cognitive, sensory, and com-
munications skills of their users. However, they also open
the door to critical cyberattacks affecting the subjects’ safety
and data security. In this context, essential vulnerabilities of
current non-invasive BCI systems have been documented,
exploited, and partially solved in the literature [12]. As
an example, the authors of [13], [14] demonstrated the
feasibility of presenting malicious visual stimuli to extract
subjects’ sensitive data like thoughts. Besides, Sundararajan
et al. [15] conducted a successful jamming attack over the
wireless communication used by the BCI, compromising
its availability. However, the irruption of invasive and non-
invasive stimulation and inhibition techniques, without se-
curity nor privacy capabilities, brings to the reality a novel
family of cyberattacks affecting the neuronal activity. We call
them Neural cyberattacks, and they present a critical number
of open challenges like the definition and categorization of
the different neural cyberattacks and their neuronal behavior,
the impact of each cyberattack to the neuronal behavior, and
their consequences in the brain and body.
To improve the previous challenges, the main contributions
of this paper are the following ones:
• The identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities on
emerging neurostimulation implants.
• To the best of our knowledge, the first description
and implementation of neural cyberattacks focused on
neuronal stimulation and affecting the activity of neural
networks allocated in the human’s brain. The proposed
cyberattacks, Neuronal Flooding and Neuronal Scan-
ning, are inspired by the behavior of current well-known
cyberattacks in computer networks.
• The definition of three metrics to evaluate the impact of
the two neural cyberattacks proposed: number of spikes,
percentage of shifts, and dispersion of spikes.
• The implementation of the previous cyberattacks in a
neuronal simulator to measure the impact produced by
each one of them and the implications that they generate
on the neuronal signaling. For that, we model a portion
of a mouse’s visual cortex based on the implementation
of a CNN where the mouse is able to exit a maze.
The paper remainder is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview of the present state-of-the-art of current
vulnerabilities, cyberattacks, and countermeasures affecting
existing BCIs. After that, Section III illustrates emerging
neurostimulation technologies and their cybersecurity con-
cerns. Subsequently, Section IV offers a formal description
of the cyberattacks proposed, while Section V describes the
implemented use case. Section VI first presents the metrics
used to evaluate the impact of these cyberattacks, followed by
the analysis of the results and impact that these cyberattacks
generate. Finally, Section VII briefly discusses the outcomes
and potential future works.
II. RELATED WORK
During the last five years, new concepts such as brain-
hacking, or neurocrime have emerged to describe relevant
aspects of cybersecurity in BCI [16], [17]. These works high-
light that neuronal engineering devices, designed to stimu-
late targeted regions of the brain, would become a critical
cybersecurity problem. In particular, they acknowledge that
attackers may maliciously attempt to program the stimula-
tion therapy, affecting the patient’s safety. Furthermore, they
emphasize that the cyberthreats do not need to be too sophis-
ticated if they only want to cause harm. In this context, as
indicated in this paper, it is possible to have a high impact on
the brain by taking advantage of neurostimulation implants
and send malicious electrical signals to the brain. Despite the
identification of these risks, there are no studies in the lit-
erature defining or implementing neural cyberattacks, where
the evaluation of their impact over the brain remains un-
explored. However, several vulnerabilities and attacks have
been detected in BCI technologies performing neural data
acquisition (e.g., EEG), which can serve as a starting point
to perform neural cyberattacks. Section III offers additional
considerations about vulnerabilities in BCI solutions.
Platforms and frameworks that enable the development
of BCI applications also present cybersecurity concerns,
as demonstrated in [18], [19]. In this context, the authors
of [18] performed an analysis of the privacy concerns of
BCI application stores, including Software Development Kits
(SDKs), Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), and
BCI applications. They discovered that most applications
have unrestricted access to subjects’ brainwave signals and
can easily extract private information about their subjects.
Moreover, Cody’s Emokit project [17], managed to break the
encryption of the Emotiv EPOC device (valid for all models
before 2016), having access to all raw data transmitted.
The authors of [19] proposed a mechanism to prevent side-
channel extraction of subjects’ private data, based on the
anonymization of neural signals before their storage and
transmission.
The majority of the existing BCI systems are oriented
to acquire, or record, neural data. Specifically, EEG BCI
devices have gained popularity in recent years, due to their
low cost and versatility, influencing the number of existing
cyberattacks exploiting BCI vulnerabilities. In this context,
the authors of [20] studied and analyzed well-known BCI
applications and their potential cybersecurity and privacy
concerns. Martinovic et al. [14] were able to extract users’
sensitive information, such as debit cards or PINs, by pre-
senting particular visual stimuli to the users and analyzing
their P300 potential response. Another attack, performed by
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Frank et al. [13], focused on presenting subliminal visual
stimuli included within a video, aiming to affect the BCI
users’ privacy. Finally, in our previous work [21], we studied
the feasibility of performing cybersecurity attacks against the
stages of the BCI cycle, considering different communica-
tion architectures, and highlighting their impact and possible
countermeasures.
In conclusion, this section demonstrates that most of the
related works are focused on presenting vulnerabilities and
cyberattacks affecting the confidentiality, availability, and
integrity of private data managed by BCIs. Nevertheless,
there is a lack of solutions considering cyberattacks affecting
the neuronal activity and, therefore, the subjects’ safety. This
article proposes two neural cyberattacks affecting the natural
behavior of single and population of neurons.
III. CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF EMERGING
NEUROSTIMULATION IMPLANTS
This section introduces three promising BCI technologies
capable of recording and stimulating neuronal activity with
single-neuron resolution. For each scenario, we offer a de-
scription of its architecture, highlighting the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities detected. Although these solutions are in an
early stage, and they are still not commercial products, they
are contemporary examples of how cybersecurity can affect
existing and future implantable BCI solutions, and in partic-
ular for solutions that can target small neuron populations.
These issues represent the starting point for the cyberattacks
illustrated in the next sections of this paper. It is important to
note that the objective of this section is not to find vulnera-
bilities in BCI devices or architectures but to justify how the
proposed cyberattacks could be performed in realistic BCI
systems.
A. NEURALINK
Neuralink aims to record and stimulate the brain using new
technologies, materials, and procedures to reduce the impact
of implanting electrodes in the brain [11]. The first element
of the Neuralink architecture are the threads, proposed as
an alternative for traditional electrodes due to their biocom-
patibility, reduced size based on thin threads that are woven
into the brain tissue, durability, and the number of electrodes
per thread. Groups of threads connect to an N1 sensor, a
sealed device in charge of receiving the neural recordings
from the threads and sending them stimulation impulses.
With a simple medical procedure, up to ten N1 implants can
be placed in the brain cortex. These devices connect, using
tiny wires tunneled under the scalp, to a coil implanted under
the ear. The coil communicates wirelessly through the skin
with a wearable device, or link, placed under the ear. The
link contains a battery that represents the only power source
in the architecture, deactivated if the user removes the link.
FIGURE 1 represents this architecture.
Although the communication mechanisms between the
coil and the link are not provided, the link is managed
via Bluetooth from external devices, such as smartphones,
Smartphone
Bluetooth
Link
N1 implants
Coil
Wireless
Common cybersecurity 
vulnerabili�es:
- Access to sensi�ve 
informa�on
- Malicious s�mula�on
Bluetooth vulnerabili�es:
- Crash the device
- Stop the communica�on
- Deadlock the device
- Access restricted func�ons
Poten�ally
vulnerable
Common cybersecurity 
vulnerabili�es:
- Firmware modifica�on
- Jamming a�acks
Poten�ally 
vulnerable
Smartphone Link Coil
Architecture 
Vulnerabili�es 
FIGURE 1: Architecture and vulnerabilities of Neuralink.
using an application. In this sense, Neuralink users can
manage and personalize their links, upgrade their firmware,
and include new security capabilities. We identify that this
scenario can be potentially vulnerable as follows. First, the
wireless mechanism used in the communication between the
coil and the link could be vulnerable, depending on the
protocol used [22]. Besides, the Bluetooth communication
between the smartphone and the link can also be vulnerable,
according to the version used [23], [24]. As an example, we
identify SweynTooth, a set of 12 vulnerabilities affecting a
large number of devices using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
technologies. Based on them, an attacker could crash the
device and stop its communications [25], deadlock the device
[26], or access functions only available for authorized users
[27].
Moreover, the external device manages the logic of both
acquisition and stimulation processes, including into these
scenarios its inherent risks, and becoming one of the most
sensitive elements of the architecture. In particular, Li et
al. [20] detected that attackers could take total control of
a smartphone running a BCI application, getting access to
sensitive information, or performing malicious stimulation
actions. Furthermore, the link is a critical element of the
architecture, where attackers can modify the firmware of the
device to have a malicious behavior, as identified by [28]
for brain implants or to perform jamming attacks to disrupt
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the communication between devices, described by [29] for
wireless networks.
B. NEURAL DUST
This architecture is composed of millions of resource-
constrained nanoscale implantable devices, also known as
neural dust, floating in the cortex, able to monitor neural
electrophysiological activity precisely [9]. These devices
communicate with the sub-dura transceiver, a miniature
device (constructed from components that are built from
nanomaterials) placed beneath the skull and below the dura
mater. This device uses two different transceivers to: (1)
power and establish communication links with the neural
dust, (2) communicate with external devices. During neural
recording, the sub-dura transceiver performs both spatial and
frequency discrimination with sufficient bandwidth to power
and interrogate each neural dust. The external transceiver is
a device without computational and storage restrictions, allo-
cated outside of the patient’s head. Wearables, smartphones,
or PCs are examples of this device. The main task of the
external transceiver is to power and communicate with the
sub-dura transceiver and to receive the neuronal behavior
from the sensing by the neural dust. FIGURE 2 presents
the architecture of this solution, as well as the potential
vulnerabilities that it presents.
External 
transceiver
Sub-dura 
transceiver
Neural 
dust
Common cybersecurity 
vulnerabili�es:
- Access to sensi�ve 
informa�on
- Malicious s�mula�on
Constrained devices:
- No security 
mechanisms
- Impersona�on
Constrained devices:
- No security 
mechanisms
- Impossibility of 
reconfigura�on
Skull
Dura
Cortex
External transceiver
Sub-dura transceiver
Wireless
Wireless
Vulnerable communica�on
Architecture 
Vulnerabili�es 
Light source
Super capacitor
Rec�fier
Piezoelectric 
nanowires
Drive
electrodes
Piezo
CMOS 
front end
Recording
sites
Polymer 
encapsula�on
WiOptND
Neural dust
FIGURE 2: Architecture and vulnerabilities of Neural dust.
Nevertheless, this technology has not been conceived fol-
lowing the principle of security and privacy by design. As
a consequence, these devices do not implement authentica-
tion mechanisms to prevent malicious users from collecting
neural sensing data from the neural dust, and they do not
protect the transmitted data. In particular, the neural dust
are resource-constrained devices without computational and
storage capabilities to execute security functionalities like
authentication protocols, ciphered communications, or data
encryption. In this sense, external attackers could power and
communicate to the implants to monitor private neural data.
Finally, the sub-dura and external transceivers do not im-
plement authentication protocols nor security mechanisms.
An attacker could impersonate the external transceiver to
communicate with the sub-dura device, and obtain sensitive
neuronal signaling.
C. WIRELESS OPTOGENETIC NANONETWORKS
The Wireless Optogenetic Nanonetworking device (WiOptND)
[10] is an extension from the neural dust [9] but with
the capability of optogenetically stimulating the neurons.
Optogenetic stimulation uses light to stimulate neurons ge-
netically engineered with specific genes that are sensitive
to signals at a particular wavelength. This in turn provides
targeted stimulation of very small population of neurons
that have been engineered, enabling precise targeting of
neural circuits within the micro-columns. Similar to the
architecture of the neural dust, the WiOptND also receives
power that is emitted from the sub-dura, which in turn
communicates to the external transceiver. However, since
the WiOptND is responsible for stimulating the neurons,
the external transceiver will communicate the sequence of
firing the neurons to the sub-dura transceiver to synchronize
the charging and communication of the WiOptND implants.
This is achieved by sending the firing sequence, in the
form of a raster plot, to the external transceiver. This opens
up new opportunities for attackers to send malicious firing
patterns into the external transceiver, which will produce
a new sequence of firing patterns for neural stimulation,
resulting in detrimental consequences for the brain. Finally,
the architecture and vulnerabilities described in FIGURE 2
also apply for WiOptND.
In conclusion, the previous vulnerabilities raise different
concerns affecting the integrity, confidentiality and availabil-
ity of subject’s neural data. These vulnerabilities motivate
different attack vectors to perform the neural cyberattacks
described in subsequent sections.
IV. DEFINITION OF NEURAL CYBERATTACKS
Once demonstrated the feasibility of stimulating individual
neurons by attacking different technological solutions, we
formally describe two cyberattacks, Neuronal Scanning and
Neuronal Flooding, aiming to maliciously affect the natural
activity of neurons during neurostimulation procedures. They
are inspired by the behavior and goals of some of the most
well-known and dangerous cyberattacks affecting computer
networks.
To formalize both cyberattacks, we denote NE ⊂ N as a
subset of neurons from the brain, where n ∈ NE expresses
every single neuron. The voltage of a single neuron in a spe-
cific instant of time is denoted as vn ∈ R, whereas vin ∈ R
indicates the voltage increase used to overstimulate a neuron
n. Moreover, twin represents a temporal window in which
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the cyberattack is performed, equivalent to the duration of
the simulation in Section VI. tattk is the time instant when
the cyberattack starts, and ∆t the amount of time between
evaluations during the process. In the implementation of the
cyberattacks, it represents the duration of the steps of the
simulation.
1) Neuronal Flooding
In the cyberworld, a flooding cyberattack is designed to
bring a network or service down by collapsing it with large
amounts of network traffic. Traffic is usually generated by
many attackers and forwarded to one or more victims. Ex-
trapolating this network cyberthreat to the brain, a Neuronal
Flooding (FLO) cyberattack consists in stimulating multiple
neurons in a particular instant of time, changing the normal
behavior of the stimulation process and generating an over-
stimulation impact. The execution of this cyberattack does
not require prior knowledge of the status of the affected
neurons since the attacker only has to decide what neurons
to stimulate and when. This fact makes this cyberattack less
complex than other cyberattacks that require prior knowledge
of the neuronal behavior.
In particular, FLO performs the overstimulation action at
tattk. In that precise moment, a subset of neuronsAN ⊆ NE is
attacked. This cyberattack is formally described in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 FLO cyberattack execution
t = 0
while t < twin do
if t == tattk then
for all n ∈ AN do
vn ← vn + vin
end for
end if
t← t + ∆t
end while
FIGURE 3 represents an example to appreciate graphically
the behavior of a FLO cyberattack, where the details of the
neuronal network used in the simulation are not relevant at
this point (addressed in Section V). In particular, it represents
the comparison of the FLO cyberattack with the spontaneous
behavior for a simulation of 80 neurons, a duration of 90ms,
and 42 neurons attacked in the instant 10ms. Green dots
represent the neuronal spontaneous behavior, blue circles
indicate the instant when the neurons are attacked, red circles
highlight the propagation of the cyberattack in time, and
those dots with a green color and red outline represent spikes
common to both spontaneous and under attack situations. In
this figure, we can see that all the attacked neurons alter their
behavior, having spikes in different moments compared to the
spontaneous activity.
Spontaneous behavior Directly attacked Attack propagation Attacked but not altered
FIGURE 3: Raster plot of a FLO cyberattack when the attack
is performed at 10ms.
2) Neuronal Scanning
Port scanning is another well-known cybersecurity technique
performed by attackers to discover vulnerabilities in operat-
ing systems, programs, and protocols using network com-
munications. In particular, it aims to test every networking
port of a machine, checking if it is open and discovering the
protocol or service available in that end-point. In the brain
context, a Neuronal Scanning (SCA) cyberattack stimulates
neurons sequentially, impacting only one neuron per instant
of time. Based on that, it is essential to note that attackers do
not require prior knowledge of the neuronal state to perform
neural scanning cyberattacks. This fact, together with the
stimulation of one neuron per instant of time, makes a low
attack complexity.
Considering the notation previously defined, Algorithm 2
describes an SCA cyberattack. In particular, it sequentially
overstimulates all the neurons included in the set of neurons
NE, without repetitions. For each neuron n, its voltage vn
increases by vin. It is essential to indicate that the conditional
clause limits the instants in which an attack can be performed,
where tattk represents the attack over the first neuron of the
set, and tattk + |NE|∆t the attack over the last neuron.
Algorithm 2 SCA cyberattack execution
t = 0
while t < twin do
if t ∈ [tattk, tattk + |NE|∆t] then
n← (t− tattk)/∆t
vn ← vn + vin
end if
t← t + ∆t
end while
Finally, FIGURE 4 shows, in a visual way, the behavior of
an SCA cyberattack. We simulate 80 neurons during 90s, and
sequentially attack all neurons, starting in the instant 10ms.
The color code followed is the same as in FIGURE 3. As
can be seen, the sequential attack of the neurons generates a
diagonal line in the spikes. All spikes over the line remain
unaltered since those neurons have not yet been affected by
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the attack. On the contrary, the spikes under the diagonal are
affected by the attack.
Spontaneous behavior Directly attacked Attack propagation
FIGURE 4: Raster plot of an SCA cyberattack, from the
instant 10ms to 90ms.
V. EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES DUE TO
CYBERATTACKS
This section introduces the use case used to implement the
cyberattacks defined in Section IV. We present the scenario
and the experimental setup implemented to create the neu-
ronal topology required to test the cyberattacks.
A. USE CASE AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The knowledge of precise neocortical synaptic connections
in mammalian is nowadays an open challenge [30]. Based
on this absence of realistic neuronal topologies, we have
studied the primary visual cortex of mice and replicated a
portion of it, modeled using a Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) [31]. This CNN was trained by means of reinforce-
ment learning [32] to represent a simple system able to make
decisions based on a maze and find its exit. As indicated
by Kuzovkin et al. [33], CNNs, and biological neuronal
networks present certain similarities. First, lower layers of a
CNN explain gamma-band signals from earlier visual areas,
whereas higher layers explain later visual regions. Further-
more, early visual areas are mapped to convolutional layers,
where the fully connected layers match the activity of higher
visual areas. That is to say, the visual recognition process
in both networks is incremental and move from simple to
abstract. At this point, it is essential to note that we cannot
compare the topology and functionality of a CNN to the
complexity of the neuronal connections of a real brain. We
only used this technique to provide a simple topology that
is then implemented in a neuronal simulator to evaluate how
attacks over a simplistic but realistic environment can affect
the activity of simulated neurons, as indicated in Section V-C.
In this context, we designed a simple proof of concept
based on the idea of a mouse that has to solve the problem of
finding the exit of a particular maze, inspired in the code from
[34]. The mouse must find the exit with the smallest number
of movements and starting from any position. We define a
maze of 7x7 coordinates, as represented in FIGURE 5. It
contains one starting position identified with "1", while the
exit is labeled with "27". Moreover, the positions colored
in gray represent obstacles, and those in white are acces-
sible positions through which the mouse can move. In this
scenario, the mouse can move in all four 2D directions: up,
down, left, and right. The numbering from 1 to 27 defines the
optimal path determined by the trained CNN to reach the exit
position, considering the lowest number of steps. Finally, it is
essential to define the concept of visible position. From each
particular cell of the maze, the mouse can visualize a square
of 3×3 adjacent positions, excluding those that represent
obstacles. This situation is highlighted in FIGURE 5 with a
red square, indicating the visible positions from the cell 15 of
the optimal path.
13141516
17
232218 2524
212019 2726
651 87
432 9
12 1011
Start
Exit
FIGURE 5: Maze used in our use case to model the move-
ment of the mouse, including the optimal path between the
starting and final cells. There are four visible positions from
the cell 15 (positions 14, 15, 16 and 17).
B. CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK
Our objective was to generate a CNN able to exit the maze
from any position. We also aimed to define a topology with
a reduced number of nodes to be compatible with resource-
constrained neuronal simulators since we aim to evaluate this
topology in multiple simulators. Nevertheless, for simplicity,
this work includes details of the implementation in only
one simulator, as described in Section V-C. To solve our
maze problem, we implemented a CNN composed of two
convolution layers and a dense layer. The ensemble of these
three layers defines a complete CNN of 276 neurons, rep-
resenting a small portion of a mouse primary visual cortex,
summarized in Table 1. We implemented this CNN using
Keras on top of TensorFlow [35].
TABLE 1: Summary of the layers of the CNN
Layer Type Filters Inputsize
Output
size
Kernel
size Stride
Activation
function Nodes
1 Conv2D 8 7×7×1 5×5×8 3×3 1 ReLU 200
2 Conv2D 8 5×5×8 3×3×8 3×3 1 ReLU 72
3 Dense - 3×3×8 4 - - ReLU 4
FIGURE 6 depicts the architecture of the implemented
CNN which is also described in Table 1. In particular, we
have included a first 2D convolution layer with a 3 × 3
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FIGURE 6: Visual representation of the implemented CNN.
It introduces a simplifications of the whole topology, indicat-
ing how the convolution process is performed and how nodes
connect between layers. The color of each node matches the
color of its associated filter.
kernel. This layer takes as input the current status of the
maze, focusing each neuron on a square of 9 (3× 3) adjacent
positions. In our experiments we determined that 8 filters
of size 3 × 3 in each layer were sufficiently expressive. To
represent the maze, each position contains a 1 value if the
position is accessible, a 0 value if it is an obstacle, or a 0.5
value in the position of the mouse.
During the training, each filter of the first layer specializes
on a particular aspect of the maze. For example, a filter
could focus on detecting vertical walls, while another could
detect corners. The filters of the second layer can detect more
complex scenarios by composing the output of these initial
detectors. Since the input is a 7 × 7 maze, and the kernel is
3×3, the first convolution process requires 25 neurons (5×5
kernel outputs) to cover the maze. Since we use 8 different
filters, the total number of neurons required to produce the
first layer’s output of the CNN is 200 (5 × 5 × 8). This is
illustrated in FIGURE 6, where each group of neurons has a
different color that matches the color of its filter. Therefore,
since the first layer generates an output of size 5× 5× 8, the
application of the 3 × 3 kernels of the second convolutional
layer requires a total of 72 (3 × 3 × 8) neurons. Finally, this
new output is sent through a last dense layer of 4 neurons, one
for each possible movement direction on the maze (left, up,
right, down). Each output is an estimation of the probability
of success with each movement, being selected the direction
with the greatest score.
In order to understand Section V-C and Section VI, it
is necessary to explain the mapping between the sequential
number of each neuron and its position in its associated filter
output. FIGURE 6 shows this mapping. Each neuron have
associated a 3-dimensional vector, where the third coordinate
is its filter and the two first coordinates, the position in that
filter output. The order is as follows: the first neuron has the
coordinates [0,0,0], corresponding to the first neuron in the
first filter output; the eighth neuron corresponds to [0,0,7];
the ninth one is [0,1,0], and so on until the 200th neuron,
with coordinates [4,4,7].
C. BIOLOGICAL NEURONAL SIMULATION
After training the CNN, we represented its resulting topol-
ogy in Brian2, a lightweight neuronal simulator [36]. We
selected Brian2 because it is adequate to run neuronal models
in user-grade computers, without the requirement of using
multiple machines, or even supercomputers. It also presents
a good behavior in the implementation of neuron models
with simplified and discontinuous dynamics (such as Leaky
Integrate-and-Fire or Izhikevich) [37]. Other alternatives,
such as NEURON, present complex solutions to model neu-
rons with fine granularity, offering distributed computation
capabilities for high demanding simulations. Nevertheless,
this functionality is unnecessary in our particular study.
We maintain in the biological simulation the exact number
of layers, the number of neurons per layer, and the topo-
logical connections between neurons. However, there is a
crucial difference between the implementation of these two
approaches. In the CNN, a filter weight represents the im-
portance that a connection between two neurons of different
layers have on the topology and, thus, over the solution. In
the biological simulation, we transform the CNN weights
to synaptic weights, representing the increase of the voltage
induced during an action potential. Table 2 summarizes these
similarities and differences between both networks.
TABLE 2: Relationship of parameters between artificial and
biological networks
CNN Simulation
Number of neurons 276
Number of layers 3
Neuronal topology 200 (Layer 1), 72 (Layer 2), 4 (Layer 3)
Input data Maze
Types of neurons Artificial Pyramidal neuron fromprimary visual cortex
Connection weights Filter weights Synaptic weights
To represent the behavior of each neuron, we decided to
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use the Izhikevich neuronal model since it is computationally
inexpensive, and it allows us to precisely model different
types of neurons within different regions of the brain [38].
This model represents an abstraction of how cortical neu-
rons behave in the brain. In particular, the following set of
equations describes the Izhikevich model, whose parame-
ters are indicated in Table 3. This model allows multiple
configurations to mimic different regions of the brain. In
our scenario, we assigned particular values to the previous
parameters to implement a regular spiking signaling from
the cerebral cortex, as indicated in [38]. Specifically, we
aimed to model pyramidal neurons from the primary visual
cortex of a mouse, which correspond to excitatory neurons
typically present in the biological visual layers L2/3, L5, and
L6 [39]. For simplicity, during the analysis of the results of
the simulation, we will refer to these layers in subsequent
sections as first layer (L2/3), second layer (L5) and third layer
(L6).
TABLE 3: Parameters used in the Izhikevich model
Parameter Description Values
v Membrane potential of a neuron [-65, 30] mV
u Membrane recovery variable providing negative feedback to v (-16, 2) mV/ms
a Time scale of u 0.02/ms
b Sensitivity of u to the sub-threshold fluctuations of v 0.2/ms
c After-spike reset value of v -65mV
d After-spike reset value of u 8mV/ms
I Injected synaptic currents {10, 15} mV/ms
v′ = 0.04v2 + 5v + 140 + u + I (1)
u′ = a(bv − u) (2)
ifv > 30mV, then
{
v ← c
u← u + d (3)
To create our neuronal topology, we used the weights of
the trained CNN as post-synaptic voltage values, normalized
within the range between 5mV and 10mV . We selected this
range because these values constitute a conservative voltage
raise within the range of values of v, indicated in Table 3.
At the beginning of the simulation, we assigned the initial
voltage of each neuron from a previously generated random
list in the range [−65mV, 0mV ). This initial value for each
neuron is constant between executions to allow their compar-
ison. To define a more realistic use case, we represented in
our simulation the movement of the mouse inside the maze
(see FIGURE 5), staying one second in each position of the
optimal path. To understand this, it is essential to introduce
the concept of intervening neurons, which defines the set of
neurons managing all the visible positions of the mouse when
it is placed in a particular position of the maze. FIGURE 7a
illustrates the relationship between the position 13 of the
optimal path and its intervening neurons, not considering
its related visible positions for simplicity. For this position,
we define nine 3×3 squares within the surface delimited
by the red square, where we represent only the first two
squares to improve the legibility of the figure. Focusing on
the first square, colored in blue, it comprises eight neurons
indexes (49 to 56), obtained from the translation between 3-
dimension coordinates previously commented in this section.
The second one, highlighted in orange, associates eight dif-
ferent neurons. After applying all nine squares, we obtain the
complete list of intervening neurons related to the position
13. This single process is repeated for every visible position
from the position 13, obtaining the complete set of interven-
ing neurons.
The movement of the mouse was implemented by provid-
ing external stimuli to the simulation via the I parameter,
where a value of 15mV was assigned to all intervening
neurons from the current location of the mouse. For all non-
intervening neurons in a specific instant, we assigned a value
of 10mV . These values align with the range defined in [38].
This information was extracted from the topology of the
CNN, which contains the relationship between the neurons
of the first layer and the positions of the maze. We took
into consideration these aspects in the experimental analysis
performed in Section VI. Based on that, we modeled with
a higher value of I those intervening neurons, transmitting
a more potent visual stimulus to those neurons related to
adjacent positions from the current location. Based on Equa-
tion 1, an increase in the I parameter will produce a voltage
rise in these intervening neurons, generating a raise in the
amplitude of the electrical signal. This behavior was modeled
taking into consideration the study performed in [40], which
indicates that a known visual stimulus generates a voltage
amplitude increase. FIGURE 7b graphically compares these
differences between values of the I parameter. It highlights
that intervening neurons present a higher number of spikes
during a particular temporal window, which is interpreted by
the brain as the reconnaissance of accessible cells in the maze
from the current position.
Finally, FIGURE 8 introduces a graphical summary of
the current use case. It depicts a mouse with a miniature
brain implant solution in its primary visual cortex, such as
Neuralink or Neural dust. To simulate its biological neuronal
network, and based on a lack of realistic cortical topologies,
a trained CNN provides the number of nodes and distribution
in layers for the biological network. In particular, we modeled
pyramidal neurons from visual layers L2/3, L5, and L6, using
the Izhikevich model with a regular spiking signaling. Based
on this scenario, an external attacker takes advantage of con-
temporary vulnerabilities in these implantable solutions to
alter the behavior of the spontaneous activity of the biological
neuronal network.
VI. RESULTS ANALYSIS BASED ON METRICS
In this section, we evaluate the impact that FLO and SCA
cyberattacks have on spontaneous neuronal activity of the
neuronal topology presented in Section V. To analyze the
evolution of the cyberattacks impact while the mouse is
moving across the maze, we consider the following three
metrics:
• Number of spikes: determine if a cyberattack either
increases or reduces the quantity of spikes compared to
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(a) Relationship between visible positions from the current location
of the mouse and their intervening neurons. In this example, the
mouse is placed in position 13.
(b) Impact of the I parameter on both intervening (15mV ) and non
intervening (10mV ) neurons.
FIGURE 7: Relationship between positions of the maze and
its implication in the modulation of neuronal signaling.
the spontaneous neuronal signaling.
• Percentage of shifts, being a shift the delay of a spike
in time (forward or backward) compared to the sponta-
neous behavior: study if a cyberattack generates signifi-
cant delays in the normal activity of the neurons.
• Dispersion of spikes in both dimensions of time and
number of spikes: analyze the spiking patterns under
attack, aiming to detect if the cyberattack causes a
modification on the distribution of the spikes.
For each layer of the topology, and combining all of
them, we measured and analyzed the number of spikes and
percentage of shifts. Finally, the dispersion of spikes is com-
puted for each position of the optimal path and grouping all
layers. Finally, we compared the impact generated by both
cyberattacks.
To better understand the impact of FLO and SCA cy-
berattacks, FIGURE 9 compares the evolution of neuronal
spikes for the spontaneous activity, a FLO cyberattack and an
SCA cyberattack. We selected three positions of the optimal
path to analyze in detail the spiking evolution along with the
simulation, presenting only the first 100ms of each position.
It is essential to note that this simplification is only for this
figure, and all the results subsequently presented consider the
complete duration of each position. As can be seen, in the
spontaneous signaling, there is a certain natural dispersion
caused by the behavior of the neuronal model used, and
the movement of the mouse (due to the the modification
of the associated I parameter). Specifically, each time the
mouse changes from one position to another, the I parameter
changes according to the intervening neurons, where a higher
value of I is translated to a higher spike rate (see Algo-
rithm 1). Since the mouse periodically changes its position,
it modifies the spiking rate of the neurons, generating a
natural dispersion in the absence of attacks. Looking at the
first position of both spontaneous and FLO, in the instant
50ms, there is a clear difference between them, since we
executed the attack in that exact instant. The set of attacked
neurons generates spikes before it was intended due to the
voltage rise produced by the attack. Consequently, we can
see that the dispersion over the following positions (13 and
27) augments, altering the natural pattern of the neurons.
Regarding the SCA cyberattack, it also starts in the instant
50ms but, its impact it is not yet present in the first 100ms
of the initial position. If we check the subsequent positions,
the attack gradually propagates, generating characteristic
ascending patterns. Subsequent subsections analyze, in a
more detailed way, the information contained in FIGURE 9,
extending the analysis to all the positions of the optimal path
and using the previous three metrics.
A. NEURONAL FLOODING
In this subsection, we aim to simultaneously attack multiple
neurons and analyze its impact using the metrics previously
indicated at the beginning of the section. The implementation
of this cyberattack is based on the general description indi-
cated in Algorithm 1. We decided to perform only the attacks
over the first layer of the topology, from where each target
neuron is randomly selected, to evaluate the propagation to
deeper layers. Furthermore, we tested a combination of two
additional parameters. The first one represents the number
of simultaneously attacked neurons, k ∈ {5, 15, ..., 95, 105}.
AN will contain k neurons randomly selected from NE, the
set of neurons in the first layer. It is worthy to note that
we reached to attack simultaneously more than half of the
neurons of the first layer, which represents a fairly aggressive
portion of the neurons. The second parameter of the attack,
VI = {20, 40, 60}, indicates the different voltage increases
in mV used to stimulate the neurons in AN. Its maximum
level, 60mV , approximately represents two-thirds of the
voltage range defined by the Izhikevich model. We have
executed each combination of parameters 10 times, denoted
as exec = 10, to ensure that the random selection of neurons
performed is representative. The value of tsim is 27s (one
second per position of the optimal path), and tattk, is 50ms.
Table 4 summarizes the previously indicated parameters.
1) Number of spikes metric
To better understand the analysis of this metric, it is necessary
to introduce FIGURE 10, which shows, for each position
of the optimal path of the maze, the number of interven-
ing neurons involved in the decision-making process of the
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FIGURE 8: Summary of our use case, indicating the translation between the topology of the CNN implemented and the
biological network simulated.
TABLE 4: Configuration of the implemented FLO cyberat-
tack
Parameter Description Values
tsim Duration of the simulation 27s
tattk Instant of the attack 50ms
NE Set containing all neurons of the first layer {1, 2, ..., 199, 200}
|AN| Number of simultaneously attacked neurons {5, 15, ..., 95, 105}
VI Set containing the voltage used to attack random neurons {20, 40, 60}mV
exec Number of executions per combination of parameters 10
mouse. Since these intervening neurons are dependent on
the number of visible positions from a particular location
of the maze, the number of intervening neurons is higher in
central cells of the maze compared to those placed near the
borders. Moreover, intervening neurons are dependent on the
topology used and the convolution process of the CNN, as
depicted in FIGURE 6.
FIGURE 11 compares, for the spontaneous signaling and
two different configurations of FLO, the total number of
spikes per position of the optimal path. In particular, the
graph plots two different amounts of neurons in AN (55 and
105 neurons) for all exec simulations. In this figure, we fixed
vi to a value of 40mV to improve its visualization. As can be
seen, both figures share a common tendency, indicating that
the higher the number of intervening neurons from a position,
the higher the number of spikes. This is a consequence of
how the mouse moves across the maze and how neurons
and positions are related based on our particular topology.
Comparing both figures, FIGURE 10 reaches its highest
peaks one position before, since this change of intervening
neurons needs to be propagated in time, affecting the number
of spikes of its following position.
In FIGURE 11, we can see that, in general, FLO cyber-
attacks reduce the number of spikes compared to the spon-
taneous activity, increasing this reduction when the mouse
progresses in the maze. Furthermore, increasing the impact
of the attack, in terms of the number of attacked neurons,
reduces the number of spikes. These aspects are aligned
with the results later presented in Section VI-A3, where this
reduction is caused by an increase of the dispersion in the
attacked neurons. However, it is worth noticing the high
number of spikes produced in the first position. The Izhike-
vich neuronal model for regular spiking generates a quick
burst of spikes in a short time, and, after that, it stabilizes
its spike rate, explaining this behavior. When we apply a
FLO cyberattack, the attacked neurons anticipate their spikes,
producing either a raise of spikes if the number of attacked
neurons is not so elevated (low dispersion in time), or a
reduction of spikes if most of the neurons are attacked (high
dispersion). Moreover, the evolution of the simulation after
the attack does not tend to come back to the spontaneous
signaling, in terms of the number of spikes. In fact, these
distances augment over time, reaching a difference of around
700 spikes in position 27, with some variability between
both FLO configurations. Based on that, these results indicate
that the effect of attacking neurons in a particular instant
propagates until the end of the simulation.
After this analysis, we considered relevant to evaluate
how the mean of spikes evolved through the three layers
of the topology with different configurations of the FLO
cyberattack. In particular, we tested different amounts of
attacked neurons and voltage increase, with exec different
executions for each combination of the previous parameters.
Using exec executions introduces variability in terms of the
randomly selected neurons for each execution. We present
these results in FIGURE 12, which represents an aggregation
of the number of spikes produced during the optimal path of
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FIGURE 9: Raster plots indicating the evolution of the spontaneous signaling and both FLO and SCA cyberattacks for three
positions of the optimal path of the maze.
FIGURE 10: Number of intervening neurons related to visi-
ble positions from each position of the optimal path.
the maze. It indicates that increasing the number of attacked
neurons derives in a higher reduction in the number of spikes,
while the application of different voltages does not produce
a high impact. The dimmed colors surrounding the main
lines of the figure indicate the fluctuations between the exec
simulations. As can be seen, the difference in the mean of
spikes compared to the spontaneous signaling grows when
the number of attacked neurons raises, having a difference
of around 60 spikes for 110 attacked neurons (half of the
first layer). These results align with those presented in FIG-
URE 11 for the positions of the optimal path, where both
figures present a clear descending trend when the number
of attacked neurons augments. Finally, the use of different
increases of voltage during the experiments did not generate
a considerable impact on the number of spikes.
FIGURE 11: Total number of spikes for all neurons of the
topology per position of the optimal path, attacking different
number of neurons (105 and 55 simultaneous neurons).
To expand the focus on this analysis and to determine
whether this descending trend is exclusive to only certain
layers, FIGURE 13 analyzes the same parameters but dif-
ferentiating between the three layers of the topology and
focusing only on the last position of the optimal path of
the maze. We can see that the variation of the mean of
spikes is more significant in deeper layers (2nd and 3rd). This
variation is due to the distribution of our topology and the
normal behavior of the brain, where initial layers propagate
their behavior to subsequent layers, magnifying their activity
via synapses. The y-axis range considerably differs between
layers, being the difference with the spontaneous signaling of
less than one spike in the first layer. The second layer offers a
broader range of around 8 spikes in the most damaging situ-
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FIGURE 12: Evolution of the mean of spikes with different
number of attacked neurons and voltage increases, aggregat-
ing all positions of the optimal path.
ation, whereas the third layer has an approximate separation
of between 10 to 25 spikes.
FIGURE 13: Mean of spikes for each layer of the topology,
focusing on the last position of the optimal path.
In summary, the previous figures indicate that, under at-
tack, the mean of spikes decreases compared to the spon-
taneous behavior. In particular, we highlight that increasing
the number of attacked neurons derives in a higher impact
in the mean of spikes. Nevertheless, there are no significant
differences in the variation of the voltage used to attack the
neurons. Finally, the number of intervening neurons from the
visible positions of the optimal path of the maze strongly
influences the mean of spikes.
2) Percentage of shifts metric
For this metric, we first evaluated the percentage of delayed
shifts for an aggregation of all three layers. After that, we
analyzed the same but combining all the positions of the
optimal path of the maze. In this test, we included a different
number of attacked neurons and voltage raises. FIGURE 14
describes this situation, where attacking a higher number
of neurons produces a higher percentage of shifts. This
ascending trend is aligned with the dispersion metric, since
an enlargement in the parameters of the attack produces a
growth of shifts. As a consequence, it generates a higher
dispersion in time and number of spikes.
If we focus on each layer of the topology, FIGURE 15
represents a FLO cyberattack for the last position of the
optimal path, where each color line indicates a voltage raise.
Focusing on the first layer, we can see a linear growth when
we augment the number of attacked neurons since only those
neurons shift in the layer. Moving to subsequent layers, we
can observe that the growth tendency is more prominent in
the second layer. This indicates that, when we advance to the
third layer, the effect of the attack gets slightly attenuated.
In conclusion, this metric indicates that attacking more
neurons derives in a higher percentage of shifts. Additionally,
and similarly to the metric studying the number of spikes,
voltage increases have not a high impact on our scenario.
FIGURE 14: Shift percentage mean for an aggregation of all
topological layers and positions of the optimal path.
FIGURE 15: Shift percentage mean for each layer of the
topology, for the last position of the optimal path.
3) Dispersion metric
We first focus on the spike dispersion over time caused by
the different number of attacked neurons for each position of
the optimal path. This means that, for each position of the
maze, we obtain the number of time instants with recorded
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spikes, independently of the number of spikes. If we take
into account that each position of the maze corresponds to
one second and that the sampling rate of Brian2, by default,
is 0.1ms, we have a total number of 10 000 instants per
position. If a position presents a higher dispersion value than
other positions, it indicates that there are more instants with
spikes in the former one. We focus on a voltage raise value of
40mV , since previous analysis indicated that this parameter
has a low impact on our scenario.
In FIGURE 16 we can observe that the spontaneous sig-
naling presents some similarities with the trend existing in
FIGURE 11 and, specifically, in those positions with the most
significant peaks. If a position presents a raise in the number
of spikes, the probability of having spikes in FIGURE 16 for
a longer period of time also increases. However, the natural
dispersion of the simulation attenuates these peaks, where the
I parameter changes according to the visible positions of the
maze. Considering both FLO configurations, we can appreci-
ate an enlargement in the temporal dispersion compared to
the spontaneous behavior. FLO cyberattacks anticipate the
spikes of the attacked neurons in a given moment, generating
a higher dispersion as the simulation progresses. Specifi-
cally, the difference with the spontaneous signaling augments
over time, induced by the natural variability of the mouse’s
movements. Although the attack with 55 neurons presents a
higher impact until position 17, from that position until the
end, the attack with 105 neurons has a higher impact from
this metric. A higher impact over the temporal dispersion
when we attack more neurons simultaneously aligns with the
results presented in FIGURE 13 for the number of spikes.
These results are also related to those presented in Section
VI-A2 for the percentage of shifts, where an intensification
in these shifts derives in a dispersion growth.
FIGURE 16: Spike dispersion over time for each position of
the optimal path.
We can also consider this dispersion from the perspective
of the number of spikes. For each position of the optimal
path, we evaluate the distribution of the number of spikes, set-
ting the voltage increase to a value of 40mV and the number
of simultaneous attacked neurons to 105. FIGURE 17 illus-
trates this distribution, where each position contains a violin
plot for both the spontaneous and under attack behaviors. It
is essential to highlight that this figure represents only one
of the exec simulations performed for the complete set of
experiments to ease the visualization. We can appreciate that
the attack in position one reaches a peak of 110 spikes due
to the increase of spikes induced by the attack performed
at that particular moment. Focusing on the distribution in-
dicated by each violin, the variance progressively reduces
when the mouse progresses in the maze, concentrating the
distribution of number of spikes around one. That means that
in the last positions there are more instants where only one
spike occurs, indicating that the attack increases the spike
dispersion as the simulation progresses.
This situation aligns with the results presented in FIG-
URE 11, where a higher number of spikes influence this
upper threshold. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the
exception in position 13, where this threshold is consid-
erably reduced. To understand this situation, we also have
to consider FIGURE 16, which indicates that this position
presents the highest percentage of dispersion, with more than
50% of spikes shifted. This position indicates the relation-
ship between these two dispersion approaches, where a high
temporal dispersion generates a reduction in the dispersion
focused on the number of spikes.
In conclusion, FLO cyberattacks generate a large impact
on the spontaneous neuronal activity. In particular, the pre-
vious figures highlight how the mouse’s natural movement
induces particular natural dispersion, both in time and num-
ber of spikes. Performing FLO cyberattacks also produces an
enlargement in the temporal dispersion, where the neuronal
activity is more scattered. This can also be analyzed from the
dispersion focused on the number of spikes since this reduc-
tion on the aggregation causes the spikes to tend to a low
number. It means that there are more instants with a fewer
number of spikes compared to the spontaneous behavior.
The previous analysis, based on the number of spikes,
percentage of shifts, and dispersion, highlights the impact
that FLO cyberattacks can generate over the spontaneous
neuronal activity. We subsequently analyze these metrics
together since they are strongly dependent between them. In
particular, the application of a FLO cyberattack generates a
decrease in the number of spikes, where these differences
are more prominent in deeper layers of the topology. These
results can be explained based on the dispersion induced by
the attack, where a growth on the dispersion reduces the
probability of multiple action potentials in the first layer.
Consequently, the post-synaptic voltage raises arrive at sub-
sequent layers in a more dispersed way, delaying the spikes.
The metric focused on the percentage of shifts over the
spontaneous signaling is closely related to the dispersion
metric. An increase in the percentage of shifts entails a
modification in the natural periodicity of the spikes. This
change is directly translated to a higher dispersion rate, both
in time and number of spikes. Finally, it is essential to note
that this behavior and results are dependent on our particular
topology. Nevertheless, they can serve as an example of how
performing a FLO cyberattack can affect neuronal activity in
a particular scenario.
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FIGURE 17: Spike dispersion over the number of spikes for each position of the optimal path.
B. NEURONAL SCANNING
This section details the implementation of an SCA cyber-
attack on our topology, based on the general description
of the attack represented by Algorithm 2. For this particu-
lar implementation, we have sequentially attacked the 200
neurons that compose the first layer of the topology. We
denote as VI = {5, 10, ..., 60, 65} the set of voltage raises,
in mV , applied separately in each SCA cyberattack. As
previously indicated for the FLO cyberattack, the duration
of the simulation, tsim, is 27s, staying the mouse one second
in each position of the optimal path of the maze. Addition-
ally, the attack initiates in the instant 50ms, represented by
tattk. To model the periodicity of attacking the neurons,
∆t indicates the temporal separation between two attacks
over two consecutive neurons, being 134ms in our particular
implementation. Each combination of parameters is executed
only once (exec = 1) since there is no variability in the
selection of neurons, as it is the case of a FLO cyberattack.
Finally, Table 5 indicates a summary of the parameters used
in the implementation of SCA cyberattacks.
TABLE 5: Configuration of the implemented SCA cyberat-
tack
Parameter Description Values
tsim Duration of the simulation 27s
tattk Start of the attack 50ms
tstep Temporal duration between attacking two neurons 134ms
NE Set containing all neurons of the first layer {1, 2, ..., 199, 200}
VI Set containing the voltage used to attack the neurons {5, 10, ..., 60, 65}mV
1) Number of spikes metric
FIGURE 18 compares the number of spikes per position of
the optimal path between the spontaneous neuronal signaling
and an SCA cyberattack. In particular, the SCA cyberattack
establishes a value of 40mV from the VI set and defines an
aggregation of all three layers of the neuronal topology. We
can appreciate the same trend observed in FIGURE 10 for
the intervening neurons from each of the studied positions.
The most prominent peaks are, as previously documented
for FLO cyberattacks, delayed one position due to the time
required to generate an impact over the neurons. These results
can be explained based on the sequential behavior of an SCA
cyberattack since the number of attacked neurons raises along
time. In addition, this progressive reduction in the number of
spikes caused by the attack aligns with the results that will be
presented in Section VI-B3 for the dispersion metric.
FIGURE 18: Total number of spikes for all neurons of the
topology, per position of the optimal path.
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After this analysis, we evaluated in FIGURE 19 the mean
of the spikes for the different voltage increases defined in VI,
for an aggregation of the three layers of the topology and the
positions of the optimal path. We can appreciate that increas-
ing the voltage used to overstimulate the neurons produces a
reduction in the number of spikes. It should be noticed that
rises higher than 20mV do not significantly influence the
impact of the attack. Performing an SCA cyberattack with
a voltage of 60mV , the most damaging situation considered,
reaches the highest difference in the number of spikes, around
70 spikes compared to the spontaneous behavior.
FIGURE 19: Evolution of the spikes mean with different
number of attacked neurons and voltage raises, for an aggre-
gation of all positions of the optimal path.
FIGURE 20 presents a differentiation per layer of the
topology for the last position of the optimal path. We can
appreciate that, in the first layer, the variation in the number
of spikes between different voltage increases is negligible,
being in all cases 24 spikes. Until 15mV , it presents a small
growth of spikes compared to the spontaneous signaling,
which benefits of the anticipation of the spikes in time. In
more aggressive voltages, the number of spikes gets more
reduced than the spontaneous behavior. Moving to the sec-
ond layer, these differences become more significant, with a
number of spikes ranging between 2 and 14 spikes according
to the voltage used. This layer presents a general descending
trend, reaching the most damaging peak with 20mV . This
trend is common to the third layer, although the range in the
number of voltages becomes broader, with a higher differ-
ence of 40 spikes compared to the spontaneous signaling. It
is interesting to highlight the proliferation of spikes in the
third layer when using 5mV , based on the slight anticipation
of spikes in time from the previous layers.
Comparing these results to those presented in FIGURE 19,
we can appreciate in the latter specific differences in the
evolution of the impact. In this figure, the most damaging
voltage is 60mV , compared to the 20mV highlighted for
the second and third layers presented in FIGURE 20. This
situation is explained by the fact that the analysis focused
on differentiating the layers only considers one position and,
because of that, some minor differences can arise.
In conclusion, the previous results indicate that performing
an SCA cyberattack generates a reduction in the number of
FIGURE 20: Spikes mean for each layer of the topology,
focusing on the last position of the optimal path.
spikes, aggravated when the mouse moves across the maze.
Increasing the voltage used to overstimulate the neurons does
not produce a significant impact with voltages higher than
20mV . Finally, the number of intervening neurons from each
position of the optimal path influences this metric.
2) Percentage of shifts metric
FIGURE 21 first presents the results concerning the per-
centage of shifts for different voltage raises. These results
represent an aggregation of the three layers and all the posi-
tions of the optimal path. In particular, this figure indicates
that the percentage of shifts increases when we raise the
voltage used to attack the neurons. We can see that an
overstimulation of 5mV generates an approximate 58% of
shifts. Slightly increasing this voltage generates considerable
impacts, between the range of 5mV and 20mV , reaching a
close percentage of 68%. Finally, increasing the stimulation
with voltages higher than 20mV does not significantly en-
large the percentage of shifts. These thresholds align with
those presented in FIGURE 19 for the aggregated number
of spikes.
To further explore this metric, we have represented in
FIGURE 22, a differentiation of each layer of the topology
for just the last position of the optimal path. We can observe
that the range of shifts is lower in the first layer compared
to deeper layers, based on the influence that the first layer
has on the latter due to the transmitted action potentials.
Besides, the growth trend existing in the first layer is more
prominent, being similar to the one shown in FIGURE 21 for
the aggregated analysis of shifts. When we go deeper into
the number of layers, we can see that the growth trend is
not that aggressive using low voltages, which indicates that
the attack progressively loses its effectiveness. It is important
to highlight that the ranges shown in FIGURE 21 for the
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FIGURE 21: Shift percentage mean for an aggregation of all
topological layers, aggregating all positions of the optimal
path.
percentage of shifts are much higher than those presented
in FIGURE 22. To understand this situation, it is worthy
of reflecting on the behavior of SCA cyberattacks. In the
first positions of the optimal path, only specific neurons are
attacked. When the attack progresses along time, the number
of neurons affected by the attack continues increasing. Based
on that situation, this last figure focused on the layers presents
higher ranges, since they correspond to the last position of the
optimal path and, thus, all 200 neurons of the first layer have
been affected.
FIGURE 22: Shift percentage mean for each layer of the
topology, only focusing on last position of the optimal path.
In conclusion, performing an SCA cyberattack generates a
raise in the percentage of shifts. This impact becomes more
damaging when the mouse moves across the maze since the
number of attacked neurons is more abundant along time.
Besides, we can observe a degradation of the impact of the
attack in deeper layers, where higher voltages are needed to
cause a similar impact in terms of shifts.
3) Dispersion metric
Focusing on the temporal dispersion caused by an SCA cy-
berattack, FIGURE 23 presents its analysis for each position
of the optimal path and the aggregation of all the neurons of
the topology. We can observe that performing an SCA cyber-
attack progressively augments the temporal dispersion, based
on the incremental number of attacked neurons over time. In
particular, this dispersion is not significant in the first five
positions of the optimal path, due to the number of attacked
neurons until that moment and the specific connections of our
topology.
FIGURE 23: Spike dispersion over time for each position of
the optimal path.
After that, we analyze in FIGURE 24 the dispersion from
the perspective of the number of spikes. In particular, we
represent, for each position of the optimal path, a violin
distribution of how the spikes behave. We can observe that,
in the first five positions, there are no significant visual
differences in the distributions, although the median of the
distribution start to slightly decrease. This is justified by
the reduced number of neurons affected by the attack until
that instant. After that position, the differences with the
spontaneous behavior progressively augment, both in the
peaks in the number of spikes and the shape of the violins.
Focusing on the number of spikes, the maximum number of
simultaneous spikes presents a reduction, particularly in the
last positions. The shape of the violins progressively changes,
due to a reduction in their variance, where the number of
spikes concentrates at the value of one only spike. That is
to say, the majority of the instants in the last positions had
only one spike. These results are aligned to those presented in
FIGURE 23 for the analysis of the temporal spike dispersion,
since both figures indicate that this dispersion increases when
the mouse progresses in the maze.
In summary, this metric indicates that performing an SCA
cyberattack disrupts the normal neuronal spiking frequency,
inducing dispersion in both temporal and number of spikes
dimensions. These differences aggravate when the mouse
progresses in the maze, based on the sequential functioning
of SCA cyberattacks.
The previous three metrics highlight how SCA cyberat-
tacks can affect the spontaneous neuronal activity on our
particular topology. We should consider them as different
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FIGURE 24: Spike dispersion over the number of spikes for each position of the optimal path.
perspectives to analyze a common issue. As previously indi-
cated, an SCA cyberattack progressively induced a decrease
in the number of spikes over time, aggravated in deeper layers
of the topology. This decrease is strongly related to both
dispersion metrics. The attack generates an alteration in the
frequency of spikes in time, producing more instants with
spikes in the simulation. Specifically, the previous results in-
dicate that in the last positions of the maze, most of the instant
only have one spike, which generates a clear difference with
the spontaneous activity. The dispersion metric is strongly
related to the percentage of shifts since this dispersion will
cause a displacement of the spikes in time. In terms of shifts,
the attack gets attenuated in deeper layers.
C. IMPACT COMPARATIVE BETWEEN NEURONAL
FLOODING AND SCANNING
This last section compares the results previously discussed
for FLO and SCA cyberattacks. Focusing on the total number
of spikes (FIGURE 11 and FIGURE 18), we can observe
that an SCA cyberattack generates a more impacting reduc-
tion in the number of spikes than the most aggressive FLO
configuration. The last positions particularly highlight these
differences.
When we analyze the number of spikes aggregating both
positions and layers (FIGURE 12 and FIGURE 19), we can
appreciate one of the main differences between the attacks. In
FLO cyberattacks, we can define as parameters of the attack
the number of neurons and the voltage used to attack those
neurons. In SCA cyberattacks, we can only specify the volt-
age, since our implementation affects all neurons of the first
layer. Based on that, there is not an immediate comparison
between these figures in terms of their trend. Nevertheless,
we can compare the most aggressive configuration for each
attack to determine which produces the highest reduction of
spikes. We can see that SCA presents a slightly higher impact
than FLO.
Focusing on the distribution of spikes per layer (FIG-
URE 13 and FIGURE 20), we can observe that there are no
significant changes between the attacks. In the second one,
SCA presents a slightly lower number of spikes. Finally, the
third layer amplifies these differences, where SCA has a more
significant reduction of spikes.
In terms of the percentage of shifts (FIGURE 14 and
FIGURE 21), FLO presents a higher impact on this metric.
Extending this comparison for each layer of the topology
(FIGURE 15 and FIGURE 22), we can see that the main
difference lies in the first layer, where SCA duplicates its
impact since subsequent layers present similar results. Based
on that, we can conclude that FLO presents a higher impact
on this metric, although the difference in percentages is
slight.
There is a clear difference between both attacks in terms
of the temporal dispersion metric (FIGURE 16 and FIG-
URE 23). FLO has a higher dispersion in the first five po-
sitions of the optimal path since the targeted neurons neurons
are all attacked in the same instant. After that, SCA evolves
in a more damaging way. Focusing on the dispersion based
on the number of spikes (FIGURE 17 and FIGURE 24), we
can observe that FLO is more effective in the first positions.
This comparative highlights that the inner mechanisms
of each attack generates different behaviors in the neuronal
activity. FLO is adequate for attacks aiming to disrupt the
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neuronal activity in a short period of time, affecting multiple
neurons in the same instant of time. On the contrary, SCA is a
more effective attack for long-term effects, requiring a certain
amount of time to reach a significant impact on the neurons.
From that threshold, the impact caused on the neurons is
more concerning.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work first presents security vulnerabilities of micron-
scale BCI to cyberattacks, particularly for implants that can
do single-cell or small population sensing and stimulation.
Taking these vulnerabilities as a starting point, we describe
two novel neural cyberattacks focused on the alteration of
neuronal signaling. In particular, we investigated the Neu-
ronal Flooding (FLO) and Neuronal Scanning (SCA), in-
spired by well-known approaches found in the cybersecurity
field. Our investigation is based on a case study of a mouse
that learns its navigation within a maze trained by a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN). The CNN was converted
into a biological neuronal simulation model representing the
workings and functions of real neurons within the brain.
The two attacks were applied to the mouse as it migrated
through the maze. To evaluate the impact of these attacks
on neuronal activity, we proposed three metrics: number of
spikes, percentage of shifts, and dispersion of spikes, both
over time and number of spikes.
A number of experiments have demonstrated that both
attacks can alter the spontaneous neuronal signaling, where
the behavior of these attacks generates distinct differences.
FLO attacks all targeted neurons in the same instant of time,
while SCA presents an incremental behavior, which requires
more time to affect the neuronal activity. Focusing on the
results, SCA presents a more damaging impact in terms of
the number of spikes, which generates a higher reduction
than FLO. In terms of shifts, FLO causes more spikes to
differ in time than SCA, although these differences are not
very significant. Finally, SCA presents a higher impact on the
dispersion of the neurons, both in time and number of spikes.
These results are highly dependent on the topology used, the
neuronal model utilized to represent the neurons, and the
types of neurons used (pyramidal from the primary visual
cortex). Because of that, this work should be considered as
a first step in the study of cyberattacks affecting spontaneous
neuronal signaling.
As future work, we plan to define a taxonomy of neu-
ronal cyberattacks affecting not only overstimulation but
also neuronal activity inhibition. We aim to explore how
neural cyberattacks can affect realistic neuronal tissues and,
in particular, various neural circuits within the cortex. Our
research lays the groundwork for security countermeasures
to also be integrated into BCI systems that utilize miniature
implants for small neuronal population stimulation that can
have a tremendous effect on the brain.
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